Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1990

Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License
Fred H. Cate
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, fcate@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cate, Fred H., "Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License" (1990). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 748.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/748

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Cable Television and the Compulsory
Copyright License
Fred H. Cate*
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..........................................

I.

192

THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF CABLE:
PROBLEMS AND EARLY EFFORTS AT SOLUTIONS...

193
The Emergence of the Cable Copyright
193
Problem .......................................
B. The Search for Solutions ....................... 195
1. Must-Carry and Other Early Regulatory
195
Strategies ..................................
2. The "Great Compromise" of 1972 ......... 199
THE COMPULSORY COPYRIGHT LICENSE SYSTEM.. 202
A. 1976 CopyrightAct ............................ 202
B. The Compulsory CopyrightLicense System in
A.

I.

Operation...................................... 207
1. Fee Gathering .............................
2. Royalty Distribution .......................

207
208

C. Developments Since the 1976 Act ............... 215
1. Rejection of Must-Carry Rules .............
2. Definition of Gross Receipts ...............
3. Reimposition of Syndicated Exclusivity
Rules ......................................
4. Changes in the Cable Industry .............
III.

215
217
218
219

PROSPECT FOR THE COMPULSORY LICENSE ........

220

A. Attacks on the Compulsory License System .....

220

* A.B. Stanford University 1984, J.D. Stanford Law School 1987. Fellow, The
Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies.
The author acknowledges the encouragement and critical insight of Paul Goldstein, Stella W. and Ira S. Lillick Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, and the
generous support ofDebevoise & Plimpton and The Annenberg Washington Program.
The author alone is responsible for the contents of this Article.

192

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.42

B. Attacks Based on New Developments ...........
C. Politics and the Compulsory License ...........
1. Arguments for Abolition of the Compulsory
License ....................................
2. Arguments for Restoring the Balance
Between Broadcasters and Cable Operators
...........................................
3. Arguments for Regulating Cable ...........
CONCLUSION ............................................

224
229
229
232
234

236

INTRODUCTION

By February 1989, more than 49 million homes-almost 55
percent of all homes with televisions in the United States-had
cable television installed.' The rapid and broad expansion of the
cable industry has created a number of substantial problems
which the legal system has attempted to solve through regulation. One specific issue addressed by federal regulators is how
cable operators are to be treated as copyright users. This issue
highlights the problems of how to treat cable vis-a-vis traditional
broadcast television and newer innovative technologies such as
home video and direct broadcast satellite television. Are cable
operators required to negotiate with copyright owners for permission to use the copyrighted material, or does the nature of
cable warrant different treatment?
This Article addresses the current and most sweeping effort
to solve the cable copyright problem: the compulsory licensing
scheme for cable's use of copyrighted works. Part I considers
the origins of the cable industry, the nature of the copyright
problems raised by cable, the interrelation of copyright problems
with other issues raised by cable, and the broad variety of solutions that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") and the courts have employed in an effort to resolve those problems. Part II examines the current solutionthe compulsory copyright license, administered by the Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal ("CRT" or
"Tribunal")-and regulatory and industry developments subsequent to creation of the compulsory copyright license. Part III
1. National Cable Television Assoc., Cable Television Developments, vol. 13, no.
50, at 1 (1989).
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discusses the prospects for the compulsory license from regulatory, technological, and political perspectives.
The Article concludes that the compulsory copyright li-cense, while viable, does not adequately reflect the market value
of the various copyrights' use. This system is, as intended, a
subsidy for the cable industry, an industry that has developed to
a point that it no longer needs the protection of a subsidy.
Moreover, the compulsory license for cable unfairly discriminates against other uses of copyrighted works, particularly home
video. The subsidy to the cable industry also endangers traditional over the air broadcasting and threatens to substantially
limit the quantity and quality of video programming and information available to the public without direct cost. The political
climate is ripe for the abolition of the compulsory copyright license in favor of either ad hoc copyright negotiations or a private system that employs blanket licenses but with rates set at,
and adjusted to maintain, market rate for the use of the copyrighted works.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF CABLE: PROBLEMS
AND EARLY EFFORTS AT SOLUTIONS

A.

The Emergence of the Cable Copyright Problem

Cable television originated in the 1950s as a concept known
as "community antenna television" ("CATV"), under which a
community would share the use of a large antenna to receive
signals more clearly from local television broadcast stations,
and, to a lesser degree, from more distant broadcast stations.
The local users were connected to this central antenna through
coaxial cable, much like several televisions in one home might be
connected to a rooftop antenna.
Broadcasters viewed cable systems with apparent favor,
since the cable systems allowed additional viewers to receive
otherwise unavailable signals. These additional viewers could
then be included by the broadcaster in calculating its viewer
market, which forms the basis of determining advertising rates.
Copyright owners derived some benefit from the cable television
viewers because the license fee that the copyright owners received from stations also took into account viewer market statistics. As a given broadcaster's market increased, its advertising
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income increased, and a portion of that increase was passed
along to copyright owners through increased license fees.
Copyright owners became dissatisfied with this arrangement as cable operators increasingly began importing distant signals containing local, non-network programming. For instance,
in 1961 a cable operator in San Diego installed an antenna capable of receiving all three of the Los Angeles network affiliates,
plus four independent Los Angeles stations.2 The advertisers
supporting those programs were, on the whole, interested only in
the local market. Advertisers interested in national markets support national (iLe., network), rather than local, programming.
The importation of network programming from one community
into another did not pose major issues with regard to cable, precisely because the advertisers that support national network programming do benefit from the increased viewership via cable and
therefore should be willing to pay more for greater viewership,
irrespective of where those viewers are located or how they receive the television signal.3
A second and related problem resulted from cable's increased importation of distant signals; local television broadcasters were forced to compete against distant broadcasters. The
signals from the distant stations, received via microwave and
cable, were often clearer than local over-the-air signals.4 Moreover, distant signals were often received from large, urban
broadcasters whose resources gave them programming and technological capabilities far beyond those of typical local broadcasters. In addition, as the signals of local broadcasters were seldom
imported into distant urban areas, the smaller stations had no
opportunity to compete on an even footing with the large distant
stations. The local station could only try to protect its declining
market share in the immediate community that could be reached
by its broadcast signal, unaided by cable.
The threat to local broadcasters was of concern to copyright owners as well. As cable viewership increased relative to
over-the-air viewership, so did the uncompensated use of the
2. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 909 (3d ed.

1987).
3. See D.

BRENNER

&

M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROAD-

§ 9.02[2] (1986).
4. Id. § 9.02[1].

CAST VIDEO
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copyrighted work. For every local broadcaster whose audience
decreased, the copyright owners lost income. If the audience decreased due to a shift to cable viewing, the copyright owners also
suffered increased uncompensated use of the copyrighted works.
For every local broadcaster who went out of business, the copyright owners lost another purchaser of copyright licenses.
The situation for copyright owners and many local broadcasters worsened as a result of a variety of new developments.
One technological innovation that exacerbated the problem was
the perfection and proliferation of color television technology.
The interference that results from tall buildings and other obstacles is barely noticeable with black and white television, but it is
marked with color television. 5 Cable operators also began
originating their own programming not available on broadcast
television, such as sports, live entertainment, feature films, and
specialized business, adult, and instructional programming. Finally, the development of economical and efficient satellite and
microwave transmission technologies enhanced the importation
of distant signals and distribution of cable programming, and
lowered the price. This in turn yielded economies of scale that
furthered the spread of cable. Cable then moved into areas already supporting affiliates of all three networks, as well as independent broadcasters. Copyright owners not only did not
receive compensation for the additional audience; they and local
broadcasters lost potential revenue as the viewing audience
shifted from broadcast to cable television.
B. The Search for Solutions
1. Must-Carry and Other Early Regulatory Strategies 6
The FCC responded to the twin concerns-unfair use of
copyrights without compensation to the copyright owner and
5. FRANKLIN, supra note 2, at 909.

6. This Article focuses on federal regulation of cable. The existence of local
regulation, however, should be noted. The relation of local and state regulation to
federal regulation of cable is a complicated subject. However, many of the FCC's
regulatory approaches and aims have also been adopted by state and local regulators.
See Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); see generally T. CARTER, M.
FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFrH ESTATE 338,
347 (1986); K. KALBA, L. LEVINE, Y. BRAUNSTEIN & P. HOCHBERG, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE STATE CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION PROJECT

(1978).
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harm to local television broadcasters-in a variety of interre-

lated and often unsuccessful ways. One of the earliest responses
came in 1965 when the FCC promulgated wide-ranging rules requiring all cable operators using microwave technology-a necessity for importing distant signals-"upon request, to carry
the signals of all local television stations, without material degradation in quality, and to refrain from duplicating the programs
of local commercial stations, either-simultaneously
or within 15
'7
days before or after local broadcast."

This First Report8 set out in detail the specifics of the
"must-carry" and "nonduplication" rules. The powerful impact
of the rules arose primarily from the broad definition given the
phrase "all local television stations." According to the ultimate
revision of the rules, a network affiliate qualified for mandatory
carriage if it was watched by noncable homes during three percent of their total weekly viewing time (I e., a three percent "audience share") and was watched by 25 percent of noncable
homes for at least five minutes per week (i.e., a 25 percent "net
circulation"). 9 Independent television stations without any network affiliation needed only to have a two percent audience
share and a five percent net circulation. 10 Since most cable systems did not carry more than twelve channels in the 1960s and
1970s, the must-carry requirement substantially limited the
cable operator's programming discretion. These rules effectively
froze the development of the cable industry. On the other hand,
the must-carry rules offered substantial protection to local
broadcasters, and unquestionably diminished uncompensated
use of the copyright owner's work." In 1966, the FCC extended
the must-carry and nonduplication rules
to cable systems that
12
did not use microwave transmission.
The FCC continued, however, to search for other regula7. Rules re Microwave, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 4 R.R.2d 1725
(1965) [hereinafter First Report].
8. Id.
9. D.

10.
11.
Quincy
(1986).
12.
R.R.2d

BRENNER &

M.

PRICE,

supra note 3, § 6.06[2][a][iii].

Id.
Must-carry rules were eliminated by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1985.
Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
See infra discussion in section II C1.
Community Antenna Television, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 6
1717 (1966) [hereinafter Second Report].
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tory strategies. The FCC promulgated "distant signal carriage"
rules, which required new cable operators in the top 100 markets 13 to obtain a waiver from the FCC in order to import distant signals. 14 To obtain a waiver, the cable operator had to
show that local broadcasting would not be harmed and that the
public interest would be served by importing distant signals.
This standard proved an almost insurmountable hurdle, particularly in the top 25 markets. Thus, the FCC rarely issued distant
signal carriage waivers.' 5 In 1972, the FCC modified its distant
signal carriage rules to provide merely a limit on the number of
distant signals that a cable operator could import.16
In 1968, the FCC initiated a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider promulgating rules requiring "retransmission
consent" as a condition of distant signal carriage.' 7 As early as
1959, the FCC had endorsed this policy,' 8 according to which
cable operators were to obtain the consent of a broadcaster
before importing its signal into a distant market. The retransmission consent policy was formulated primarily to allow the
copyright owner to benefit from cable's use of copyrighted
works. The copyright owner could contract with television
broadcasters, as a condition for granting licenses to use copyrighted works, to have the broadcasters exact some sort of additional license fee from cable operators in exchange for consent to
import. This fee could then be shared by the broadcaster and
copyright owner.
The retransmission consent approach proved unworkable.
"The practical effect of retransmission consent was the absence
13. For a list of the top 50 television markets, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.51(a) (1988),
and for the second 50 markets, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.51(b) (1988).
14. See Second Report, supra note 12, at 782, 6 R.R.2d at 1785.
15. Swackhamer, Cable-Copyrigh" The Corruption of Consensus, 6 COMM/ENT
L.J. 283, 288 (1983).
16. Community Antenna Television Sys., Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 24
R.R.2d 1501, recon. denied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326, 25 R.R.2d 1501 (1972) [hereinafter
Cable Television Report]. Distant signal carriage rules were virtually eliminated in
1980. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663,
48 R.R.2d 171 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Marite TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
17. Community Antenna Televisions Sys., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968) [hereinafter CATV].
18. Community Antenna Systems Impact, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
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of any new signals in the top 100 markets." 19 Despite FCC encouragement, Congress refused to adopt retransmission consent
as a statutorily-mandated system. In 1971, the FCC abandoned
20
the concept of retransmission consent.
In 1970, the FCC considered a regulatory approach under
which cable operators in the top 100 markets would be allowed
to import four distant signals from independent broadcasters. 21
This new approach required the cable operators to strip the commercials from the distant signals and replace them with commercials provided by local broadcasters. The FCC rejected this
approach the following year.2
Other cable regulatory approaches, although often designed
primarily to address other issues, have also had an impact on the
copyright and local broadcaster problems. From time to time,
the FCC has required cable operators to allocate a certain
number of channels for local non-profit or public-interest programming.23 The FCC has also required cable operators to generate a certain amount of original programming. 24 Both of these
rules reduced the amount of copyrighted material that a given
system could transmit. They also, in theory, lessened the competition problem for local broadcasters, since cable operators
had less space on their systems for imported signals. In reality,
however, the allocation and original programming requirements
may have furthered cable's competition with local broadcasters,
by forcing cable operators to carry programming to which the
local broadcasters had little or no access.
The FCC has not been alone in regulating cable. The
Supreme Court has also played a significant role, particularly in
assessing cable operators' liability for copyright infringement.
19. Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 288 n.30.
20. Commission Proposals for Cable Television Regulation, 31 F.C.C.2d 115,
117, 22 R.R.2d 1755, 1762 (1971) [hereinafter Commission Proposals].
21. Community Antenna Television Systems, Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970).
22. See Commission Proposals, supra note 20, at 115.
23. See CATV, supra note 17, at 425-27 (allowing public access channels); Community Antenna Television Systems, First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 20607, 17 R.R.2d 1570, 1577-78 (1969), re 'dsub noma. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp, 440
U.S. 689 (1979) [hereinafter CATV II] (encouraging experimentation with public access channels).
24. See CATV II, supra note 23, at 201.
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In the 1968 case Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists2' the Court
examined the copyright liability of cable operators under the
1909 Copyright Act and concluded that passive retransmission
of local signals did not constitute an infringement under the
1909 Act. 6 Cable operators thus were not legally liable for retransmitting broadcast signals without compensating the copyright owner. The cable industry used Fortnightly to combat the
FCC's prohibition on importing distant signals, a regulation that
copyright owners had avidly supported.
2. The "Great Compromise" of 1972
By the early 1970s no one was satisfied with the state of
cable industry regulations. 27 Cable operators were suffering
from the effects of must-carry, nonduplication, and exclusivity
rules. Local broadcasters perceived cable to be a very real threat
to their future livelihood. And many copyright owners were getting little if any compensation for the cable operators' increasing
use of their copyrighted works, since the operators were under
no legal obligation to pay royalties on programming contained in
retransmitted broadcast signals. In 1972, with the assistance of
Clay Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunications
Policy and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Cable Television, producers, syndicators, broadcasters, and cable operators
reached a compromise. The compromise, entitled the OTP Consensus Agreement, contained four major provisions:
1. Syndicated exclusivity;
2. Distant signal carriage rules;
3. Broadcasters' right to sue for copyright infringement if
a cable operator violated an exclusivity agreement; and
4. Cable copyright liability, to be administered through a
compulsory license system. 8
The Consensus Agreement was the foundation for the modem
era of cable regulation.
The first two provisions of the compromise were adopted in
1972 by the FCC in Cable Television Report. 9 Syndicated exclu25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

392 U.S. 390 (1968).
Id.
See Swackhamer, supra note 15.
Id. at 291.
36 F.C.C.2d 143, 24 R.R.2d 1501 (1972).
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sivity "provided that cable systems in large markets could not
carry distant signals showing programs to which a local station
had acquired exclusive future local rights." 30 The distant signal
carriage rules-first tried in a more stringent form in 19663-were modified merely to limit the number of distant signals that
a cable operator could import. In its 1972 Cable Television Report the FCC also adopted "anti-leapfrogging" rules, according
to which a cable operator who wished to import distant signals
had to choose those that originated nearest to the operator.32
This rule effectively prevented the development of a "superstation"-"an independent television station that makes its programs available to cable systems throughout the country, via
satellite transmission. ' 33 The anti-leapfrogging rules were eliminated in 1975.a4
The latter two provisions of the OTP Consensus Agreement-relating to cable copyright liability-were ultimately to
be adopted by Congress as part of the 1976 Copyright Act.
In 1974 the Supreme Court examined the active importation of distant broadcast signals in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem.36 In Teleprompter,the Court held that
the act of importing distant signals did not distinguish the case
from Fortnightly;37 the cable operator was still not subject to lia-

bility for copyright infringement.
However, for at least three reasons, Teleprompter did not
extinguish copyright liability for cable operators who retransmitted broadcast programming under the existing copyright laws.
First, copyright liability had been part of the Great Compromise. The Court's holding may have made it possible for cable
operators to abrogate that element; but such a step would seem
likely to bring down the full panoply of earlier FCC regulatory
strategies on the cable operators' heads. The danger was not
only that cable's development and profitability would be ham30. T.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
fied at
36.
37.

CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 347.
Second Report, supra note 12, at 725, 6 R.R.2d at 1717 (1966).
Cable Television Report, supra note 16, at 143, 24 R.R.2d at 1501.
T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 346.
Leapfrog Rules, 7 F.C.C.2d 625, 35 R.R.2d 1673 (1975).
General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codi17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810) (1976).
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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pered by the regulations, but also that the uncertainty created by
the variety of regulatory schemes would be prolonged, making it
difficult for cable operators to attract the substantial capital necessary for developing and expanding their networks.
Second, while the Supreme Court declined to find passive
retransmission of distant signals to constitute copyright infringement, the Court suggested that Congress could make it a violation, stating: "Detailed regulations of these relationships, and
any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important
problems in this field, must be left to Congress. 38 Moreover,
the issue had been under consideration in Congress since the late
1960s, 39 and cable operators had reason to fear that a floor fight
in Congress in 1974 against the powerful broadcasting interests,
would likely result in an arrangement less favorable for cable
operators than the OTP consensus agreement.
Third, the compulsory licensing scheme in the Consensus
Agreement, while requiring payments that cable operators had
not until then been required to make, still promised to be a relatively inexpensive solution for the cable operators. 40 It was certainly less expensive than the full cost of ad hoe copyright
licenses combined with the transaction costs involved in negotiating those licenses.
After almost three decades of experimentation, the scene
was set for a regulatory approach based on the 1972 OTP Consensus Agreement that would balance the interests of cable operFollowing
ators, broadcasters, and copyright owners.
Teleprompter and more than a decade of Congressional debate
over revising the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright issues raised
by cable still had not been solved. The experience of the FCC, as
well as the dictates of the Supreme Court, made clear that the
38. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394, 414
(1974).
39. For a detailed treatment of Congress' forays into solving the cable copyright
problem, see Hatfield & Garrett, A Reexamination of Cable Television's Compulsory
License Royalty Rates, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 433, 436-56 (1983).
40. There is little available evidence to demonstrate what a "free market" negotiation system for cable royalty licenses would have cost cable operators. Most industry
analysts, representing both cable and broadcast television, the federal government,
and copyright owners, agree that the royalty payments due under the 1972 compromise and under the 1976 compulsory license scheme did not reflect the full market
value of the programming being used. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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cable-copyright issues would have to be addressed by Congress
in the form of copyright legislation, rather than by the FCC
adopting more rules focusing on diminishing the impact of
cable's infringing use of copyrighted works.
II. THE COMPULSORY COPYRIGHT LICENSE SYSTEM
L

1976 CopyrightAct

In 1976 Congress concluded its revision of the 1909 Copyright Act and passed the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.41 The
provisions of the 1976 Act dealing specifically with cable, reflect
the latter two provisions of the 1972 OTP Consensus Agreement, and are embodied in sections 111, 501, and 510 of the Act.
The Act's primary effect on cable is to specify that cable retransmission is a public performance and therefore subject to full
copyright liability. The Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), the
secondary transmission to the public of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display of a work is actionable as an act
of infringement under section 501, and is fully subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and 509 ....42

Congress concluded, however, that "it would be impractical
and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted
by a cable system.1 43 Therefore, Congress established a compulsory copyright license system for cable. 44
It.is not altogether clear why Congress determined that ad
hoc copyright license negotiations would be "impractical" and
"unduly burdensome," or whether those determinations were
correct. Leslie Swackhamer suggests that Congress was concerned with two primary problems. 45 First, Congress perceived
that broadcast interests were economically and politically very
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
42. Id.§ 111(b).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House
REPORT].

44. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1976). Congress also retained or created three other compulsory licenses: the statutory mechanical royalty, the jukebox royalty, and the educational broadcasting royalty. See generally Greenman & Deutsch, The Copyright
Royalty Tribunaland the Statutory MechanicalRoyalty: History and Prospect, 1 CARDozo ARTs & ENT.L.. 1 (1982).
45. See Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 295 n.62.
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strong; free market negotiations between broadcasters and cable
operators would result in unfairly costly copyright licenses, or in
no licenses at all. Swackhamer notes particularly Congress's
concern with "big television networks, big television stations and
big television program producers. ' 46 The second problem was
that "given the numerous cable systems, channels, distant signals and programs, an individual cable system's bargaining on a
signal-by-signal basis would be prohibitive in terms of time and
cost." 47 Part DI will discuss these concerns, the degree to which
Congress correctly assessed them in 1976, and the degree to
which they exist today.
Congress only applied the compulsory license to distant signals imported by a cable operator, and to non-network programming. 48 Retransmission of local broadcast signals was exempted
from copyright liability by Congress. Congress also exempted
the retransmission of network programming from copyright
liability.
The rationale behind both of these exemptions was that
copyright owners in those two situations were already being
fully compensated for the performance of their works. 49 Congress exempted local programming on the theory that local advertisers would pay the broadcasters more for a larger local
audience whether that audience was reached via broadcast or
cable television. The copyright owner, in turn, would charge the
broadcaster a higher license fee based on the larger audience. In
the case of the exemption for network programming, Congress
assumed that the advertisers supporting national programming
were interested in a national audience and would therefore pay
for every viewer, irrespective of where that viewer was located
and how that viewer received the program. Copyright owners
could again exact a higher license fee from the broadcaster.
Congress also provided exemptions for the retransmission of
governmental and non-profit signals, and for apartment and hotel master antenna systems.50
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), (f) (1982).
49. Id.
50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), (4) (1982). See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 43,
at 90-93.
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The 1976 Act provides detailed requirements for cable system licensing. 51 The signals protected by the compulsory license
must be imported in strict compliance with FCC rules.5 2 The
Act also specifically notes that the cable operator must comply
with FCC and CRT notice and royalty fee deposit requirements. 53 The imported signals may not be altered in any way,54
effectively preventing a cable operator from importing a distant
signal, stripping its advertising, and then selling the newly created slots to new advertisers. The one exception to the Act's prohibition on altering imported signals-for commercial
advertising market research-specifically notes that any alteration must not be "performed for the purpose of deriving income
from the sale of that commercial time." 55
The Act further prohibits cable operators from importing
signals from other countries, with certain limited exceptions for
Canadian and Mexican stations available in the immediate area
where the United States borders those countries.56 Signals must
be transmitted simultaneously to be covered by the compulsory
license, except that a cable system may transmit a videotaped
recording of an imported signal once,5 7 without deleting or editing, 8 and only ifthe operator ensures that the tape will not be
further broadcast, given to another person, or copied.5 9 The
tape must be erased following its transmission 6° and the cable
operator must file an affidavit attesting to compliance with these
requirements. 61 Failure to comply with section 11l's requirements renders the compulsory license invalid, and subjects the
cable operator to full copyright liability. 62
51. See id. § 11(c); see also Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 296.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 1ll(c)(1) (1982).
53. Id. §§ 11 l(c)(2)(A)-(B). The requirements dealing specifically with copyright
are enumerated in § 11l(d).
54. Id. § I11(c)(3).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 111(c)(4).
57. Id. § llI(e)(1)(A).
58. Id. § 111(e)(1)(B).
59. Id.§ 111(e)(1)(C). Section 111(e)(2) provides a limited exception to allow
cable operators in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to share a tape with another cable operator in
the same area.
60. Id. § 111(e)(I)(C).
61. Ido§ 111(e)(1)(D).
62. Congress did exempt certain programming from the compulsory license sys-
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The Copyright Act provides an initial set of statutory license fees, which reflects a last-minute compromise between the
National Cable Television Association ("NCTA") and the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA").6 The CRT is
authorized to revise those rates in response to changes in FCC
distant signal carriage or syndicated exclusivity rules" and, on a
five-year basis, in response to inflation or deflation.65
It seems certain, and almost all commentators have accepted, that Congress gave cable operators a subsidy in the form
of below-market royalty rates." When the CRT undertook to
revise the statutory royalty rates in response to FCC regulatory
changes, 67 the Tribunal discontinued the below-market royalty
tern. Programming originated by the cable operator orby the operator ofanonbroadcast, satellite-distributed network is not covered by the compulsory license. Id.
§ 111(a)(3).
63. See Hatfield & Garrett, supra note 39, at 437.
64. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b)(2)(B), (C)(1982).
65. Id. §§ 801(b)(2)(A), (D).
66. For purposes of this Article, I accept the overwhelming consensus of industry
analysts, government officials, and scholarly commentators, as well as the logic of the
1972 OTP Consensus Agreement and the 1976 Royalty Rate Compromise, that the
royalty rates provided in the Copyright Act do not equal the rates that would be
arrived at if freely negotiated between cable operators and copyright owners. According to Swackhamer:
An examination into the history of the development of the cable compulsory
license reveals a desire to give the infant cable industry a financial break so
that it could afford the costly process of laying cable. The royalty fees were
extremely low, approximately one percent of subscriber revenues. Although
the copyright owners in principle opposed such low rates, they agreed to
support the arrangement because of the protection afforded by the FCC distant signal and syndicated exclusivity rules.
Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 306-07 (footnotes omitted).
Another commentator observed, "program suppliers certainly assumed they were
getting less than they would if cable were subjected to full copyright liability." Note,
The Collapseof Consensus: Effects of the Deregulationof Cable Television, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 612, 622 (1981). See also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223
Before the Subcomm. on Courts,Civil Libertiesand the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 732 (1975) (testimony of Jack Valenti);
Id. at 778 (testimony of John Summers).
Only the cable industry itself has suggested that the compulsory copyright license
results in market or above-market payments to copyright owners, because of the
CRT's practice of aggregating contiguous, commonly owned cable systems, even if
they do not share programming. Since payments under the compulsory license are
based on size of cable systems, even if the rate by which the license fee is calculated is
below market, the NCTA charges that the fee itself may be inflated. NCTA Says
Copyright Office Artificially Inflates CableFees, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 7, 1989, at 6.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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rates for cable operators.68 According to the CRT, the rates
"could not be considered those that would result from full mar69
ketplace conditions if the compulsory license did not exist."
In 1985, the NTIA Office of Policy Analysis and Development ("NTIA") concluded: "The cutrent cable copyright regime, with its artificial compulsory license and governmentally
dictated royalty payments, constitutes a subsidy to the cable television industry. ' 70 Four years later, the FCC stated: "Logic
and evidence suggest that compulsory copyright license rates
paid by cable systems and hence the distributions made by the
CRT to program suppliers, are below market prices. 71
In 1980 the FCC repealed its distant signal carriage and
syndicated exclusivity rules, 72 upsetting the previous rate struc-

ture. Cable operators now had unlimited access to copyrighted
works, for the use of which the operators had to pay only the
below-market rates of the compulsory copyright license.
Neither broadcasters nor copyright owners had any action
against cable operators, so long as the operators kept their contributions to the CRT current.
The CRT responded quickly, as Congress had authorized it
to do in the event that the distant signal carriage or syndicated
exclusivity rules were deleted. The CRT imposed higher ratesin some cases as much as 1500 percent higher-for those signals
that would have been protected by distant signal carriage or syndicated exclusivity rules.73 The Tribunal indicated that, while
the transaction costs argument in favor of the compulsory license was still valid, the cable television industry did not warrant below market royalty rates:
Testimony before both the Tribunal and congressional commit68. Adjustment of the Royalty Rate for Cable Systems, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146,
52,153 (1982).
69. Id. at 52,153.
70. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., CABLE RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST TELEVISION PROGRAMS FOLLOWING ELIMINATION OF THE "MUST CARRY" RULES 2 (1985). [hereinafter ELiMINATION OF THE "MUST CARRY" RULES].

71. Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, 4 FCC Rcd 6562,
6571, 66 R.R.2d 1259, 1274 (1989).
72. Syndicated Exclusivity, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 48 R.R.2d 139, aff'd, Malrite TV v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
73. Adjustment of the Royalty Rate for Cable Systems, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146
(1982).
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tees, including that of cable industry representatives and operators,
permits the conclusion that the principal current justification for the
cable compulsory license is the burden of the transaction costs with
individual copyright owners. We do not find in the compulsory li-

cense as it exists today, any publicpolicyjustificationfor establishing
royalty rates7below
reasonable marketplace expectations of the copy4
right owners.

The CRT concluded that the statutory rates "could not be
considered those that would result from full marketplace conditions if the compulsory license did not exist." 75 Congress, however, had given the Tribunal authority only to revise rates in"
response to FCC regulatory actions. Thus, the Tribunal could
create "market" royalty rates only for those signals affected by
the FCC's repeal of distant signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules. For the first time, the compulsory copyright license
fee for at least some signals neared the market rate.
B.

The Compulsory CopyrightLicense System in Operation

The foundation of the compulsory copyright license system
is the Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 76
The CRT was specially created by the 1976 Copyright Act; it is
composed of five commissioners, appointed by the President and
is designed to operate as an independent entity, within the legislative branch. The CRT oversees the collection and distribution
of compulsory copyright royalties and periodically revises the
rate structure. The first two CRT responsibilities-gathering
and distributing copyright royalties-are discussed below.
77
1. Fee Gathering

In order to obtain the protection of the compulsory license,
cable operators must register with the Copyright Office, file accounting forms, and pay copyright royalty fees every six months
to the U.S. Register of Copyrights, an agency of the Library of
Congress. The Register of Copyrights holds the money in an
74. Id. at 52,153 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 52,154.
76. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-10 (1976).
77. The following discussion relies in large part upon the rules set forth among
the general provisions of Title 37 regarding patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
Compulsory Licenses for Secondary Transmissions by Cable Systems, 37 C.F.R.
§ 201.17 (1988).
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escrow account until it is time for distributions to copyright
owners.

The fees are determined according to a complicated series
of calculations. There are four primary elements involved in the
calculations. First; all cable operators pay a fee in order to carry
distant broadcast signals. Second, each operator pays a low per
signal fee for every broadcast signal that would have been permitted under the FCC's distant signal carriage rules, as of June
24, 1981, the date that Malrite TV v. FCC,7 8 affirming the FCC's
decision to eliminate the distant signal carriage and syndicated
exclusivity rules, came into effect. Third, each operator pays a
significantly higher per signal fee for broadcast signals that
would not have been permitted under the FCC's distant signal
carriage rules on June 24, 1981. Fourth, for cable systems operating in the top 100 markets, each operator must pay a
surcharge fee ("syndex surcharge") for every broadcast signal
that would not have been permitted under the FCC's syndicated
exclusivity rules.7 9
The fees, except for the smallest cable systems, are determined as a percentage of the cable operator's "gross receipts."8 0
These elements are adjusted according to the size and location of
the system involved, as well as an approximate measure of the
amount of non-network programming that the system imports.8 '
2.

Royalty Distribution

Once the royalty fees have been collected from cable operators, the CRT distributes those fees to copyright owners according to procedures set forth in section ll of the Copyright
Revision Act. Every person claiming to be entitled to the compulsory license fees must file a claim with the CRT. The Act
grants a specific exemption from the antitrust laws to encourage
claimants to agree among themselves as to the division of the
compulsory license fees. Beginning August 1st of each year, the
CRT determines whether a controversy concerning the distribu82
tion of royalty fees exists.
78.
79.
80.
81.

652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
The definition of "gross receipts" is discussed infra section II B2.
See generally 17 U.S.C. § I11(f) (1982).
37 C.F.R. § 308.2(d) (1988).

82. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(5)(A).(B) (1982).
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Not surprisingly, some controversy over the distribution of
fees always exists; so the CRT is empowered to conduct a proceeding to determine the distribution of royalty fees. Chapter 8
of the Act, which covers the operation of the CRT, provides little guidance about how the CRT is to conduct distribution proceedings. The CRT has adopted a two-step procedure: (1) in
"Phase I," the CRT "determine[s] the allocation of cable royalties to specific groups of claimants; ' 8 3 (2) in "Phase II," the
cable royalties to individual claimants within
CRT "allocate[s]
84
group."
each
The claimant groups usually include: s5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Program Syndicators ("Syndicators")
87

86

Joint Sports Claimants ("JSC")

Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS") s s
National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB")8 9
Music Claimants ("Music") 90
Devotional Claimants ("Devotional") 91
Canadian Claimants ("Canadian") 92
National Public Radio ("NPR") 9'

The CRT evaluates each group's claim on the cable copyright royalties according to three primary and two secondary
83. 1983 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding, Notice of Final Determination,
51 Fed. Reg. 4415 (1986) [hereinafter 1983 Proceeding].
84. Id.
85. This list is adapted from the 1983 Proceeding, supra note 83, at 12,792,
12,793-94.
86. Syndicators include the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
("MPAA.'), representing 83 producers and syndicators of movies, television series,
and special programs; and Multimedia Entertainment, Inc. ("Multimedia"), representing Multimedia and Cox Communication, Inc.
87. JSC includes the Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association,
the National Hockey League, the North American Soccer League, and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association.
88. PBS represents the Public Broadcasting Service, as well as 240 noncommercial television stations, and 17 producers of public television programs.
89. NAB represents 435 U.S. television and radio stations. The NAB is also part
of the syndicator claimant group because some of the broadcast stations the NAB
represents syndicate, as well as produce, programming.
90. Music includes the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers
("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), and SESAC, Inc.
91. Devotionals include the Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc., the Old Time
Gospel Hour, and the PTL Television Network.
92. Canadian represents Canadian program producers and television
broadcasters.
93. NPR represents National Public Radio, as well as 134 noncommercial radio
stations.
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criteria. The primary criteria are:- (1) harm caused to copyright
owners by cable transmissions of copyrighted works; (2) benefit
derived from the secondary transmission of copyrighted works;
and (3) marketplace value of the copyrighted works that are
transmitted. The secondary criteria are: (1) the quality of the
copyrighted works; and (2) time-related considerations. 94 According to the CRT, the Tribunal's underlying goal is "to simulate market evaluation."95
The claimant groups present voluminous evidence, consisting largely of specially-commissioned studies on the importance
of copyrighted works to the cable systems and the impact of
cable's use of the copyrighted works on copyright owners and
broadcasters. The CRT then makes its Phase I determinations.
This part of the process, as discussed below, may take years to
complete. For example, the CRT published its 1983 Phase I determinations on February 4, 1986.96
Once the CRT has completed its Phase I allocations, it begins Phase II, in which it evaluates disputed claims among members of specific groups. In practice, the Phase II distributions
are almost entirely settled by private negotiations. The group in
which the CRT has repeatedly declared that a controversy has
existed is the Program Syndicator (or Supplier) group. Here the
CRT has settled disputes between MPAA, Multimedia, and the
NAB.
The process is more easily understood by examining the distributions that the CRT has actually ordered. The 1978 distributions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
97
1978 CRT CABLE ROYALTY DISTRIBUTIONS
Phase I
Syndicators and Devotionals
JSC

75.00%
12.00

PBS

5.25

U.S. and Canadian Broadcasters
Music
Phase II

3.25
4.50

94. 1983 Proceeding, supra note 83, at 12,793.
95. Id.
96. Id.
-97. The chart is compiled from data in the 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution
Determination, Notice of Final Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026 (1980).
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(In 1978 the CRT found no Phase II distributions to be in controversy and
therefore conducted no Phase II hearings; all individual claimants settled
privately.)
The 1979-1982 distributions are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
1979-1982 CRT CABLE ROYALTY DISTRIBUTIONS9 8
1979
1980
1981
Phase I
Syndicators
JSC
PBS
NAB (I&l)
Music
Canadian
NPR
Devotionals

69.20%
15.00
5.25
5.06
4.25
.75
.25
.35

69.20
14.95
5.23
5.04
4.24
.75
.25
.35

Phase H
MPAA
97.41%
97.67
Multimedia
1.61
1.73
SIN
.71
.71
(All other individual claimants settled privately.)

1982

69.20
14.95
5.23
5.04
4.24
.75
.25
.35

68.75
14.85
5.20
5.01
4.21
.74
.25
1.00

97.67
1.73
.71

98.28
1.00
.71

There are five points to be made about the 1979-1982 CRT

distributions. First, these distributions were not finalized until

1986. 9 ' They were revised three times in 1985 alone, before the

last final order for the distribution was issued in 1986.100 Second, most of the percentages for specific groups were arrived at

through private negotiations. Third, even with the lengthy delay
before a final order and even with private negotiations, for each

year there remain disputed claims for which a portion of the
total fee pool has been retained by the CRT pending final resolu-

tion. The CRT retained four percent to settle the 1979 controversies, 14 percent for 1980, four percent for 1981, and four

percent for 1982. The fourth and most obvious point is that the
98. The chart is compiled from the Further Amendment to Order Granting
Further Partial Distributions 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, 50 Fed. Reg. 9112, 9113-14
(1985).
99. Order Granting Final Distribution of 1979-1982 Cable Royalty Fees, 51 Fed.
Reg. 8224 (1986).
100. See 50 Fed. Reg. 5290 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 6027 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 9112
(1985). A large portion of the funds were dispersed earlier to claimant groups where
no controversy existed, according to CRT partial distribution orders.
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lion's share of the royalties are going to the MPAA. The next
largest allotment, only one-fourth of the size of MPAA's portion, goes to the JSC. If these two groups are omitted, the other
nine groups of claimants are battling over only 18 percent of the
royalties. Fifth and finally, the tinkering that takes place from
year to year is so small as to be statistically insignificant.
The actual dollar amounts involved are not insubstantial;
the dollar amounts involved in the adjustments from year to
year, however, may be. The total royalty pool in 1978 was $13
million; in 1979 was $21 million; in 1980 was $26 million; in
1981 was $32 million; and in 1982 was $42 million. 101
Despite these sizeable amounts, the adjustments from year
to year are small. For instance, in 1979 the MPAA claimed
$14.4 million of the total fund.10 2 In 1982, after three rounds of
adjustments, the MPAA claimed $28.49 million. Without those
adjustments, had the MPAA been required to claim in 1982
under its 1979 percentage, it could have claimed only $28.42
million-a difference of only $70,000. This amount is divided,
after attorneys' fees, among the 83 producers comprising the
MPAA. PBS claimed $1.12 million in 1979 and $2.19 million in
1982. Without the three rounds of adjustments, PBS could have
claimed $2.21 million in 1982-a difference of $20,000, to be divided among 258 individual claimants.
The 1983 distribution cycle involved a new set of concerns.
The two categories of higher fees imposed by the CRT first took
effect in 1983, in response to the FCC's elimination of distant
signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules. The CRT determined that the funds generated under the 3.75 percent category
and the syndex surcharge should be distributed separately from
the rest of the royalty pool. 10 3 For the first time, the CRT undertook Phase I hearings for three separate funds; Phase II hear101. Id. These figures are rounded and are not adjusted to reflect current dollar
value. "
102. These figures are calculated from the total fund amount and the percentage of
the fund awarded to the group in question. These are not the amounts of actual distributions because: (1) they do not take into accpunt the reserve that the CRT maintains
to settle disputed claims; (2) they are not calculated in real dollars paid out over time;
and (3) they do not reflect interest accrued by the funds while awaiting CRT
distribution.
103. 1983 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding, Notice of Final Determination,
51 Fed. Reg. 12,792 (1986) [hereinafter Cable Royalty].
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ings were unaffected. The resulting distributions are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3
1983 CRT CABLE ROYALTY DISTRIBUTIONS'
Basic
3.75%
Phase I
Syndicators
JSC
PBS
NAB
Music
Canadian
NPRt
Devotionals

67.10%
16.35
5.20
5.00
4.50
.75
1.10
Total

°4

Syndex

95.50
72.00
0
17.50
0
0
0
5.00
4.50
4.50
0
.25
Special settlement of $144,497.85.
0
.75

Phase 11
98.20%
MPAA
1.00
Multimedia
.80
NAB
(All other individual claimants settled privately.)

The 1984, 1985, and 1986 CRT royalty distributions are
identical to the 1983 distributions in Phase I,105 and differ only
minimally in Phase II.
Table 4
1984-86 CRT CABLE ROYALTY DISTRIBUTIONS
1984
1985
Phase II
98.48%
99.18%
MPAA
.83
.83
Multimedia
.70
NAB
(All other individual claimants settled privately.)" ° 7

06

1986
98.50%
.83
.68

The small shifts in each claimant's percentage share of the
104. This table is adapted from Cable Royalty, id. at 12,818.
105. The special settlement in Phase I for NPR was determined to be a percentage
of the entire fund-0.18 percent-in the 1985 and 1986 settlements, rather than a
lump sum.
106. This table is adapted from: 1984 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding,
Notice of Final Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 8408, 8420 (1987); 1985 Cable Royalty
Distribution Proceeding, Notice of Final Determination, 53 Fed. Reg. 7132, 7140
(1988); 1986 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding, Notice of Final Determination,
54 Fed. Reg. 16,148, 16,155 (1989).
107. In 1985 the Asociacion de Compositores y Editores de Musica
Latinoamericana received a $1.00 settlement.
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cable royalty fund has not stopped the various claimants from
appealing in federal court all but one cycle, between 1978 and
1983, in an effort to have their share increased.10 8 The only distribution cycle during that period that was not appealed1981-involved no change from the previous year's distribution,
which was appealed. In every appeal, the courts have upheld the
distributions and affirmed the CRT's broad discretionary powers. The language of the case deciding the appeals from the 1983
distributions gives some indication of the courts' view of these
annual appeals:
Each distribution was afirmed in substantial part by a court increasingly critical of "the claimants' studied tack to date of 'boundless litigiousness,' and increasingly unwilling to engage in detailed
analysis of 'the various nooks and crannies of the Tribunal's decisions.' Thus encouraged either to forgo the usual automatic challenge to the Tribunal's determinations, no doubt an unthinkable
alternative in the "highly litigious copyright-owfier subculture," or
to seek a different Court of Appeals, claimants to the 1983 Cable
Royalty Fund petitioned us [the Second Circuit] for review of the
cable royalty distribution. With the exception of two issues, however, only the circuit is new, and the petitions raise the usual array
of noisily contested minutiae concerning the precise allocations of
cable royalty fees....
We emerge from our analysis of these inherently subjective
judgment calls and rough balancing of hotly competing claims with
one overriding conclusion: it is the Tribunal which Congress, for
better or worse, has entrusted with an unenviable mission of dividing up the booty among copyright holders.... We will not hesitate
henceforth, should this tack of litigation-to-the-hilt continue to
characterize the aftermath of CRT distribution decisions, to refrain
from elaborately responding to the myriad of claims and contentions advanced by a highly litigious copyright-owner subculture. 0 9

The CRT has announced the completion of its Phase I determinations for the 1987 cable royalty distribution, but has not
108. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. CRT, 809 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1986) (appealing the 1983 CRT royalty distributions); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. CRT,
772 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) (appealing 1980 and
1982 CRT royalty distributions); Christian Br6adcasting Network v. CRT, 720 F.2d
1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (appealing the 1979 CRT royalty distributions); National Ass'n
of Broadcasters v. CRT, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (appealing the 1978 CRT
royalty distributions).
109. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. CRT, 809 F.2d 172, 174, 183 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted).
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yet completed the Phase II proceedings. 110
C. Developments Since the 1976 Act
1. Rejection of Must-Carry Rules
Two of the most significant developments in cable since the
passage of the Copyright Revision Act were the elimination of
the distant signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules,"' to
which the CRT's response was quick and dramatic." 2 Another
important change in cable regulation, to which the CRT has not
responded and may lack the statutory ability to do so, is the
rejection of must-carry rules by the D.C. Circuit in 1985.
Quincy Cable TV v. FCC" 3 involved a direct challenge,
based on the First Amendment, to the FCC's must-carry rules.
The court evaluated the harm that must-carry rules were
designed to remedy and concluded:
Although the goals of the rules-preserving local broadcastingcan be viewed as unrelated to the suppression or protection of any
set of ideas, the rules nonetheless profoundly affect values that lie
near the heart of the First Amendment. They favor one group of
another. They severely impinge on editorial
speakers over
1 14
discretion.

In rejecting the must-carry rules, the court did not touch on
the role that those rules play as an important factor underlying
the compulsory copyright license, in reducing cable copyright
infringement, or in balancing the relationship between broadcasters, cable operators, and copyright owners. The U.S.
Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. 1 s
Following the Quincy decision, the FCC responded to intense congressional and broadcast industry pressure and proposed revised must-carry rules.11 6 The new rules-reflecting a
compromise between the broadcast and cable industries-re110. 1987 Cable Royalty Distribution Proceeding, Notice of Phase I Settlement,
Notice of Partial Distribution, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,386 (1989).
111. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
113. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 11.9 (1986).
114. Id. at 1453.
115. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
116. The FCC promulgated must-carry rules in 1986. Carriage of Television
Broadcast Signals by Cable Televisions Systems, I FCC Rcd 864, 61 R.R.2d 792
(1986). The rules were met with wide-spread opposition. Amendment of Must Carry
Rules, 2 FCC Red 3593, 62 R.R.2d 1251 (1987).
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quired cable systems, depending upon their channel capacity, to
carry a limited number of "significantly viewed" broadcast signals. Cable operators were also required to inform subscribers
that not all over-the-air broadcast signals may be available via
cable service, and to offer to each subscriber, until 1991, an input
selector switch ("A/B switch") that allows
viewers to easily se117
lect between cable and broadcast signals.
The FCC's new must-carry rules were struck down as unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC.Is The court applied the
test set out in United States v. O'Brien,' 9 which is traditionally
applied to government restrictions which burden speech only incidentally. But even under that relatively unrestrictive test, the
court held that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that the rules
were necessary to advance any "substantial governmental interest" or were "narrowly tailored" as required by O'Brien. 20 The
Court of Appeals subsequently clarified that the FCC's consumer education and A/B switch requirements are not affected
by the court's decision striking down the Commission's must2

1
carry rules.

1

Absent action by Congress, the appellate court's decision in
Century appears to foreclose the possibility of must-carry rules
from the FCC. As discussed below,12 2 some commentators
viewed must-carry as the trade-off for the compulsory copyright
license: if cable operators were to be forced to carry local broadcast signals, they should at least be sheltered from copyright liability. With the elimination of must-carry, the need for the
compulsory license may be called into question. And while the
CRT has adjusted the compulsory license system in response to
regulatory changes, such as elimination of the distant signal and
syndicated exclusivity rules, even if it believed that the absence
117. Without such a switch, a viewer would have to manually unplug the cable
lead from the television set and attach in its place an antenna lead.
118. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 837 F.2d 517, cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
2014 (1988).
119. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
120. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988).
121. Id.
122. See infra section III B.
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of must-carry rules warrants similar adjustments, it may lack the
statutory authority to respond.
2.

Definition of Gross Receipts

The second significant development since passage of the
1976 Act was the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's clarification as
to what portion of cable operators' income must be used as the
basis of the royalty calculation. In 1986 D.C. District Court
Judge June Green ruled that the Copyright Act requirement that
cable operators pay copyright royalties based on their "gross receipts," applied only to gross receipts from retransmission of
broadcast signals. 123 According to Judge Green, income from
original programming and premium programming did not have
to be included in the calculation of the royalty.1 24 In January
1988, the Court of Appeals overturned Judge Green's decision
and reinstated the original interpretation of the Copyright Office; gross receipts includes the full amount of fees derived from
cable customers for any tier of cable services that included one
or more broadcast signals.125
The D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in not
deferring to the Copyright Office, the administrative agency responsible for applying provisions of the copyright law. In addition, the court found that allowing cable operators to allocate
receipts between broadcast and non-broadcast programming
would undermine Congress' goal, in adopting the compulsory
license, of minimizing transaction costs. Finally, the court noted
that defining gross receipts irrespective of the source of the programming was "perhaps the only reasonable way of computing
gross receipts that ensures a revenue base large enough to perform the 2 function
Congress intended-reimbursing copyright
6
owners."

The court's opinion is significant because it has the potential to dramatically change the amount of the royalties paid by
123. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 641 F. Supp. 1154
(D.D.C. 1986), rev'd in part,rev'd and remanded in part, 836 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2901 (1988).
124. Id.
125. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 836 F.2d 599
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2901 (1988).
126. Id. at 612.

218

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.42

cable operators under the compulsory license. Some commentators have suggested that the decision could as much as double
copyright fees, 127 and MPAA President Jack Valenti applauded
the decision as "restoring to copyright owners their rightful
28
share of an already undervalued copyright royalty fund."'
However, cable operators may be able to minimize the impact of
the decision by placing all broadcast signals on one tier. Programming from other sources would then be offered to subscribers on a separate tier of service, the receipts from which would
not be used for calculating copyright royalties as no broadcast
signal would be included on the tier. As a result, the royalty fees
paid by cable operators would not be higher as a result of the
appellate court's decision. In the absence of higher royalties,
pressure from copyright owners to eliminate the compulsory license system is unlikely to abate.
3.

Reimposition of Syndicated Exclusivity Rules

On May 18, 1988, the FCC reimposed the syndicated exclusivity rules. 129 Under the new rules, a local television broadcaster can negotiate with suppliers of non-network programming
for exclusive distribution rights. Cable operators are then prevented from acquiring the same programming through the importation of distant signals. 130
Three features of the syndicated exclusivity rules are certain
to substantially diminish the impact of the new rules. First, the
new rules apply to exclusivity contracts only if they contain the
precise language specified by the Commission regarding the enforceability of exclusive programming rights. Second, the new
rules do not apply to cable systems with fewer than 1000 subscribers-about 50 percent of operating cable systems. Third,
the rules also do not require cable systems to delete a program in
situations where two or more broadcast stations carrying a pro127. Lloyd, Ruling Could Double Cable Copyright Fees, CABLE T.V. AND NEW
MEDIA LAW & FINANCE, Jan. 1988, at 3.
128. NCTA Loses Major CopyrightCase to MPAA, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 6, 1988, at
2.
129. Program Exclusivity Amendment, 3 FCC Rcd. 5299, 64 R.R. 2d 1818 (1988),
aff'd sub nom., United Video v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
130. Network non-duplication rules give the same protection to contracts negotiated by network affiliates for network programming.
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gram are "significantly viewed"1 31 within the area served by the
cable system, or where that area is within the Grade B contours 32 of two or more such stations.
4. Changes in the Cable Industry
The cable industry in particular has changed dramatically
since the compulsory copyright license was adopted in 1976.
Three of these developments particularly influence the debate
over the compulsory copyright license.
First, as the FCC recently noted, "In 1976, cable television
was primarily a retransmission medium for broadcast signals.
Today, it is an active participant in the program distribution
marketplace."' 33 Various recent analyses have concluded that
between 92 and 94 percent of cable services do not involve the
34
retransmission of broadcast signals.1
Second, multiple system operators ("MSOs") and large individual cable systems account for an increasing percentage of
cable subscribers. For instance, in 1976 the largest 50 MSOs,
accounted for 69 percent of cable subscribers; in 1987 the largest
50 MSOs accounted for more than 83 percent of cable subscribers. 135 Similarly, in 1976, there were 68 cable systems with more
than 20,000 subscribers; in 1987, 464 systems had more than
20,000 subscribers respectively. 36
Third, the capacity of most cable systems has increased dramatically. In 1976 only 12 percent of cable systems offered more
than 20 channels; in 1987 more than 65 percent offered more
than 20 channels.' 37 Ninety-one percent of cable subscribers in
131. "Significantly viewed" signals include both: (1) those signals that the FCC
has determined are significantly viewed in a given county and that are contained in
Appendix A of the Cable Television Report, supra note 16; and (2) signals determined
by an independent professional audience survey to be significantly viewed in a given
community. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.54(a)-(b) (1988).
132. The "Grade B Countour" of a television station is the approximate coverage
over average terrain in the absence of intervening stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.683(a)
(1988).
133. Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, 4 FCC Rcd. 6562,
6571, 66 R.R.2d 1259, 1274 (1989) [hereinafter Cable Retransmission].
134. Cable Network ProgrammingUniverse, BROADCASTING, Aug. 22, 1988, at 3233, 38; Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, Aug. 15, 1988, at 65.

135. Cable Retransmission, supra note 133, at 6570, 66 R.R.2d at 1272.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6569, 66 R.R.2d at 1271.
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1987 had access to 20 or more channels; 77 percent had access to
30 or more channels.
These three developments, especially when combined with
the general proliferation of cable service,1 38 increase both cable
system demand for non-broadcast programming and the ability
of cable operators to negotiate effectively and efficiently for permission to carry such programming. As discussed below, cable
operators are confronted with the question of why their ability
to negotiate for non-broadcast programming might not be applied to obtaining the copyright holder's consent for retransmission of broadcast programming as well.
III. PROSPECT FOR THE COMPULSORY LICENSE
The compulsory cable copyright license has come under
considerable attack from broadcasters, copyright owners, commentators, the FCC, the Justice Department, the Copyright Office, and even the former Chairman of the CRT itself. The
arguments generally focus on one or more of the features of the
system that are inherently unnecessary or unfair, or on regulatory and technological changes that make the current system unworkable or inequitable.
A.

Attacks on the Compulsory License System

The compulsory license system has been the target of Opposition since it was first proposed in the Great Compromise of
1972. One obvious criticism is that the system is slow and inefficient. In its first decade of operation, the CRT has not been able
to operate according to the annual distribution system provided
in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. The 1978 distributions
were not finalized until 1980.139 The 1979 through 1982 distributions were not finalized until 1986.140 Subsequent
distribu141
tions have required three years each to finalize.
Much of the slow start could initially be attributed to the
138. By 1989, cable systems had been installed in 49.5 million homes, almost 55
percent of U.S. homes that have televisions. Cable Television Developments, supra
note 1, at 1.
139. 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026 (1980).
140. 51 Fed. Reg. 8224 (1986).
141. 52 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 7132 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 16,148
(1989).
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fact that this was the first decade of the CRT's operations. The
CRT had to create its own procedures, and then have each proposed distribution arrived at according to the new procedures,
tested in court. 142 But today its procedures have become more
regularized and a jurisprudence supporting the CRT has developed. Nevertheless, the CRT continues to operate at a snail's
pace.143
Another common and justifiable criticism levelled at the
CRT is that much time and expense is required to obtain minimal results. The CRT's total distributions are significant, but
the change in allotments from year to year is statistically insignificant. 44 Nonetheless, these distributions are the result of days
of hearings, countless studies, and the work of staffs of lawyers,
accountants, and experts. One obvious response to this problem
is to amend the law to require distribution hearings less frequently, such as only every three or five years. Also, the fact
that the changes from year to year are not necessarily significant
does not change the fact that the CRT oversees an annual fund
that has exceeded the $40 million level at a fairly low administrative cost.
Other criticisms of the compulsory license are directed at
the heart of the system. Congress failed to articulate a valid reason for treating cable so favorably as compared with other users
of copyrighted works. The House Report on the 1976 Copyright
Act concluded that ad hoc negotiations between cable operators
and copyright owners would be "impractical" and "unduly burdensome," but the Report did not present evidence to support its
conclusions. 145 Subsequent findings by government agencies
146
have disagreed with Congress' conclusions.
Leslie Swackhamer identified congressional concern with
the threat of "big television networks, big television stations and
big television program producers."' 4 7 Yet much of this concern
is alleviated by Congress' determination in the 1976 Act that
cable retransmission of network programming did not constitute
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra note 110.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
1976 House REPORT, supra note 43.
See infra notes 176-178.
Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 295 n.62.
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copyright infringement. The threat of "big stations" has been
diminished with the elimination of the FCC's distant signal carriage and must-carry rules. 14s Cable operators now have the
legal and economic standing to deal with powerful broadcaster
interests.
Swackhamer identifies a second congressional concern underlying the compulsory license system to be the problem of
transaction costs.1 49 However, there are at least five reasons to
believe that these costs are exaggerated. First, broadcasters have
been negotiating for licenses for copyrighted programs without a
legislative scheme for more than two decades. Second, under the
compulsory license scheme, the lion's share of the royalties have
been taken by only two distinct groups: MPAA and the sports
program producers. 50 Third, cable already negotiates with producers of cable programming. According to Dennis Patrick, former FCC Chairman, and Diane Killory, former FCC General
Counsel, cable operators already negotiate directly for three out
of four programs their systems carry. 51 Fourth, most cable programming is taken from a limited number of sources, for instance, a commercial supplier like Home Box Office ("HBO") or
a superstation like TBS. Fifth, the problems caused by ad hoc
negotiation costs have been remedied in the past in the music
field by the creation of private schemes-like ASCAP and
BMI-which are more responsive to market pressures than any
legislative scheme.
Another set of arguments levelled against the compulsory
license system recognizes that cable, as an infant industry, may
at one time have needed the sort of subsidy that the system
seems to provide. However, cable now is sufficiently large and
established to compete on even terms with broadcasters, and no
longer warrants the type of protection that the compulsory license offers. Between 1976 and 1983, the number of subscribers
to basic cable service increased from 12 million to over 28 mil148. See supra notes 72, 113-21 and accompanying text.
149. Swackhamer, supra note 15, at 295 n.62.

150. Since 1978, syndicators (suppliers) have not received less than 67.1% of the
royalty pool. The JSC have never received less than 12%, and usually received 15%.
See supra notes 97-98; 106 and accompanying text.
151. Patrick & Killory, Intellectual PropertyRights in the ElectronicMedia: The
Casefor Expanding ContractualFreedom, 5 Comm. LAW. 3, 4 (1987).
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lion. 15 2 By 1989, cable systems had been installed in 49.5 million
homes, i.e. almost 55 percent of the U.S. homes that have televisions.' 5 3 It is projected that the cable industry will have nearly
$15 billion
in revenues and a 57 percent penetration rate by
1991.154
Even with the CRT's dramatic increase in rates for prohibited signals following the elimination of distant signal carriage
and syndicated exclusivity rules, the rates do not equal, nor in
the case of rates for permitted signals do they near, the real mar155
If
ket value of the use copyrighted works to cable operators.
the rates reflect market value, then there is no need for the CRT.
If they do not, then the CRT is blocking market equilibrium, to
the unfair advantage of cable operators and disadvantage of
broadcasters,
copyright owners, and competing new
technologies.
A study conducted by Shooshan & Jackson, Inc., concludes
that the imbalance created by the compulsory license system in
relative position between cable operators on the one hand, and
broadcasters and copyright owners on the other, threatens to se' Shooshan and Jackson argue
verely disadvantage the public. 56
that the compulsory license system unfairly favors cable operators, and that their position has been further improved by the
elimination of distant signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity
rules. The study observes:
Once a producer sells his program rights to any broadcaster, the
program may appear on any cable system in the country-and the
producer is powerless to prevent it...

Given such negative effects, copyright owners have resorted to
other means of regaining control over their product. For example,
some producers have withdrawn their programs from over-the-air

broadcast stations in order to prevent cable carriage. In at least one
case, a producer
has reportedly paid cable systems not to carry his
15 7
program.

152. CABLEVISIoN, Apr. 18, 1983, at 145.
153. Cable Television Developments, supra note 1, at 1.
154. COMM. DAILY, Dec. 16, 1987, at 7 (untitled).

155. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
156. H. SHOOSHAN, C. JAcKsoN, S. BESEN & J. WILSON, CABLE COPYRIGHT AND
CONSUMER WELFARE: THE HIDDEN COST OF THE COMPULSORY LIcENSE (1981)

[hereinafter H. SHOOSHAN].
157. Id. at 2-3.
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The Shooshan & Jackson study is discussed in greater detail
below.
The imbalance between cable operators and broadcasters
and copyright owners is particularly ironic because the cable industry is aggressively seeking regulatory treatment that is denied
broadcasters and other transmission technologies. In addition,
while benefitting from the compulsory license regulatory structure which limits the amount that cable operators pay for programming, the cable industry has argued that cable wishes to
compete against broadcasters in an unregulated market. For instance, cable operators have asked the FCC to deregulate the
fees that cable operators can charge customers for
15 8
programming.
B. Attacks Based on New Developments
Almost all of the arguments above are exacerbated by regulatory changes and technological developments that have occurred since the passage of the Copyright Revision Act. The
abolition of the FCC's distant signal carriage and syndicated exclusivity rules already have been discussed. 159 It is sufficient to
note that these changes in regulatory policy were anticipated by
Congress, and that the CRT responded quickly by dramatically
increasing royalty rates. Whether the CRT responded adequately, or whether an appropriate response within a compulsory license system is possible, is more difficult to measure, but,
with the reimposition of syndicated exclusivity rules, less
necessary.
The more striking regulatory change, and the one to which
the CRT has not responded, is the abolition of must-carry rules
in 1985 and again in 1987. The termination of these rules has
become the focal point of much of the criticism of the compulsory license system. Some critics charge that the compulsory
license system and the must-carry rules were opposite sides of a
coin. They argue that if cable operators were going to be forced
to carry all local broadcast stations, then at least they should be
insured from copyright liability for so doing. In a sense, the
158. Patrick & Killory, supra note 151, at 5.
159. See generally Patrick & Killory, supra note 151; Swackhamer, supra note 15;

Simon, The Collapseof Consensus: Effects of the Deregulationof Cable Television, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1981).
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compulsory license was the price paid for the must-carry regulatory strategy. Now, with must-carry eliminated, cable operators
can both choose which signals they wish to carry and use the
compulsory license to protect themselves from copyright
liability.
However, the must-carry argument against the compulsory
license is flawed at several points. First, the compulsory license
from the outset applied only to broadcast signals that the cable
operator was not required to carry under the must-carry rules.
Had Congress seen the compulsory 'license as a trade-off for
must-carry, it could have tailored the compulsory license system
to more readily reflect that trade-off. Congress, instead, completely excluded must-carry signals from copyright liability, rejecting the relationship between the compulsory license and
must-carry. Other signals---distant, non-network signals, unrelated to must-carry signals, for which the cable operator would
otherwise be subject to copyright liability for using-were protected under the below-market compulsory license royalty rates.
Second, following Malrite and the dramatic increase in
compulsory copyright royalty rates, it is not clear that cable operators are reaping as much benefit from the compulsory license
as some critics suggest. Certainly, in the case of the signals that
were not permissible pre-Malrite, the cable operators are now
paying at or near market rate. One could argue that the CRT
should raise the royalty rates on those signals that used to be
covered by must-carry rules. However, such a raise would offend the FCC's interest in localism and in maintaining a healthy
local broadcast industry. The Quincy court, in abolishing the
must-carry rules, did not hold that the FCC's interest in localism was unconstitutional but that must-carry constituted too
great an infringement on the First Amendment to be a valid
means of achieving the desired end. A dramatic increase in royalty rates would cause a percentage of the signals that used to be
carried under must-carry, which cable operators may have chosen to continue, to suddenly be discontinued. 160
There are other problems with the must-carry-based argu160. This may already be the case, according to an FCC survey.
BROADCAST SIGNAL CARRIAGE SURVEY REPORT

CABLE SYSTEM

(Sept. 1, 1988) (available in the

FCLJ office). According to the survey, 31% of the television stations that responded
said that cable systems had dropped their signals or denied carriage since must-carry
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ment against the compulsory license system. Must-carry and the
compulsory license have arguably very different historical origins and purposes. Must-carry was one of the FCC's earliest
regulatory strategies designed to protect the broadcast industry
and to promote localism. The compulsory license is a recent
congressional effort to solve the cable copyright problem, coming only after the Supreme Court's Teleprompter holding that
passive retransmission of distant signals was not then a copyright offense.
In practice, there is little economic symmetry between
must-carry and the compulsory license. Must-carry benefits
broadcasters. The compulsory license royalties, on the other
hand, go primarily to copyright owners. Only five percent of the
total fund has gone to broadcasters. 161 Some broadcasters may
benefit from the compulsory license scheme, but it is primarily
because the ease and affordability of the license encourages cable
operators to carry broadcast signals. If cable operators had to
negotiate directly with each copyright owner, it is likely that
many operators would not carry less important broadcast signals; it is thus the broadcasters of those signals who would be
hardest hit by abolishing the compulsory license.
The arguments against the compulsory copyright license
that are harder to deal with are those focusing on the availability
and regulatory treatment of new technologies that, like cable,
transmit programming into homes. And it is from the comparison of cable to these other technologies that many of the arguments against the compulsory copyrighted license find their
greatest support.
First, what are the new transmission technologies in question? 162 Subscription Television ("STV") uses traditional broad-

cast technology to transmit scrambled programming into the

home.1 63 Subscribers have a decoder that unscrambles the signal
and displays the program on a regular television. Multipoint
Distribution Service ("MDS") combines satellite and microwave

rules were eliminated in July 1985. Thirty-three percent of broadcasters that responded claimed that their signals had been repositioned.
161. See supra notes 97-98, 106; 108 and accompanying text.
162. For more detail on these technologies and the FCC's regulatory stance toward
each, see generally H. SHOOSHAN, supra note 156, at 35-36 (Table 3).
163. See Hatfield & Garret, supra note 39, at 470 n. 129.
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transmission to send data and/or programming to customers'
homes via either microwave transmissions or through scrambled
cable signals.'6 Low-Power Television ("LPTV") is not a new
technology, but has recently received a flurry of attention from
potential system offerors. 165 LPTV operates like conventional
television but with lower power and to a smaller audience. Finally, videocassettes and videodiscs ("home video") allow consumers to purchase or rent pre-recorded programming, or to
record programming from cable or broadcast signals, that is
played back on video players in the customer's home.16 6 Home
video may very well be the most prevalent form of program
"transmission" to customer homes by the end of the century. 67
Under the regulatory structure now in place, operators of
any of these video distribution systems are required to negotiate
directly with copyright owners for licenses to transmit (or, in the
case of video, to produce) the programming. Otherwise, the operator would be subject to full liability for copyright infringement. The same is true of the other transmission system
analogous to cable: traditional broadcast television. An independent television station must obtain a license from the
owner of the copyright of a given work in order to broadcast,
that work; failure to do so is a violation of the performance
right.
In the case of only one video transmission technology
other than cable has Congress chosen to employ a compulsory
license. Direct Broadcast Satellites ('DBS") transmit programming from satellites directly to receiving disk antennae at consumers' homes. 6" Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer
Act of 1988169 to permit satellite carriers to take advantage of a'
compulsory copyright license.
The license provision is severely limited. It came into effect
on January 1, 1989, and will expire automatically on December
164. See D. BRENNER & M. PRiCE, supra note 3, § 16.04; Hatfield & Garrett,
supra note 39, at 470 n.127.
165. Hatfield & Garrett, supra note 39, at 470 n.128.
166. Id. at 470 n.131.
167. As of 1984, 14 million homes had VCRs, and another 12 million units were

expected to be purchased in 1984. Thus, one-third of the U.S. households would own
VCRs. Worth, CableTechnology, in CABLE TELEVISION, RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE 34 (1985).
168. See BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 3, ch. 15; Hatfield & Garrett, supra note
39, at 471 n.130.
169. Pub L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988).
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31, 1994. The license applies only to satellite retransmission of
network programming to "unserved" households-households
which cannot receive, either by traditional over-the-air broadcast or via cable, any affiliate of the network whose programming is to be offered by the satellite carrier. 170 The compulsory
license for satellite carriers thus reflects a narrow, short-lived
compromise to encourage the distribution of network programming by satellite to persons
who would otherwise have no access
171
to that programming.
With the sole exception of satellite service to "unserved"
households, only cable is treated differently than other video distribution technologies; only cable is afforded the opportunity to
obtain a license rather than be subject to full copyright liability.
And there is no articulated basis for treating cable specially.
Cable operators face no higher transaction costs nor occupy
weaker bargaining positions than do the operators of these new
technology transmission techniques.
The concern here is not only with equity in regulatory treatment, but also with the long-term effect of such inequity on the
public. The Shooshan & Jackson study concludes that because
copyrights are not affected when a work is transmitted through
any means other than traditional broadcast, copyright owners
will start licensing their works only to nonbroadcast video
distributors.

i

As a result of the compulsory license, producers have an incentive to avoid sale to over-the-air broadcasters, selling instead to distribution systems which will allow them to retain control. This
incentive will increase as cable and other alternative distribution
systems, such as subscription television (STV) and multipoint distribution service (MDS), reach more and more homes. In effect, the
compulsory license, originally created for a fledgling cable industry,
now works to the advantage of all systems which compete with
traditional broadcasting. 172

The ultimate effect of the government permitting cable operators to retransmit programming that is carried by broadcast
television stations, without subjecting cable operators to full
copyright liability, is to facilitate the erosion of the development
and availability of programming available via traditional over170. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10) (as amended 1982).
171. See P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.8.3 (1989).
172. H. SHOOSHAN, supra note 156, at 4.
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the-air television, arguably in direct contradiction to the FCC's
charge to regulate "as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires. "

C.

173

Politics and the Compulsory License

1. Arguments for Abolition of the Compulsory License
For many of the reasons discussed above, critics argue that
the compulsory license system should be eliminated in favor of
either ad hoc copyright negotiations or a private licensing
agency. These critics have included David Ladd, former Register of Copyrights, Dennis Patrick and Mark Fowler, former
Chairmen of the FCC, and even Clarence James, former Chairman of the CRT, among other government spokespersons. 174
Administration criticism began as early as 1979, only one
year after the compulsory license system was implemented.
Henry Geller, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, testified before the House Subcommittee on Communications that cable operators should be
subject to full copyright liability. 175 In 1981, following the
FCC's repeal of syndicated exclusivity and distant signal rules,
the NTIA released a report176 concluding that "full copyright
liability for cable, with marketplace forces determining the royalties, was workable and would be a more efficient system than a
177
compulsory license."'
Following the release of the 1981 NTIA report, the Administration launched a full-scale attack on the compulsory copyright system. According to the report:
Bernard Wunder, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, urged Congress to further the deregulation of cable by
repealing the compulsory license and allowing marketplace forces to
work. The FCC concurred that cable should have full copyright
173. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
174. See Compulsory Licensingfor Cable Television: A Report, 12 . ARTS MGMT.
& L. 29, 36 (1983).
175. Hearingson H.R. 3333, Sections 453 and 548, Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Henry Geller).
176. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., CABLE COPYRIGHT LIABILITY: ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMPULSORY LICENSE (1981).

177. Id.
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liability. The Department of Justice found the compulsory license
mechanism to be inefficient and impose unnecessary costs and recommended that it be repealed. The Copyright Office also recommended that the compulsory license be repealed as it is an
unnecessary degradation of the copyright owner. Even the Chairman of1the
CRT agreed that there was no need for the compulsory
78
license.

The FCC returned to the compulsory copyright license in
1988 17 and 1989,1 s0 recommending that the system be abolished. In its 1988 statement, Chairman Patrick voted in favor of
repealing the compulsory license; Commissioner Quello concurred, but only with respect to the license for distant signals.
Commissioner Dennis, however, withheld her vote until the
Commission's report to Congress recommending repeal of the
license was completed. As a result, there was no quorum and no
formal action could be taken.
In his separate statement, Chairman Patrick stressed the
structural, technological, and regulatory changes affecting the
cable television industry. Consolidation of ownership among
cable systems makes negotiations for individual licenses more
practical, while the proliferation of cable-originated programming reduces the need for cable to rely on broadcast programming. In addition, the Chairman wrote, "The evidence adduced
in the course of this thoroughgoing investigation strongly suggests that the compulsory copyright license impedes the efficient
functioning of the market and its ability to make consumers
sovereign."' 8 l
On May 30, 1989, the FCC unanimously recommended the
repeal of the compulsory copyright license for all broadcast signals. 82 While no report was issued at the time, Chairman Patrick argued in a separate statement that the compulsory license
has "disadvantaged competitive alternatives to cable" by provid178. NTIA, CABLE RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST TELEvISION PROGRAMS
FOLLOWING ELIMINATION OF THE "MUST CARRY" RULES, supra note 70, app. A at

6-7 (citations omitted).
179. Cable Retransmission, supra note 133.
180. Repeal of Compulsory License for All Broadcast Signals Recommended, FCC
Press Release No. DC-1423 (May 30, 1989) [hereinafter Repeal of Compulsory
License].
181. Cable Retransmission, supra note 133, at 6597, 66 R.R.2d at 1300 (statement
of Chairman Dennis Patrick).
182. Repeal of Compulsory License, supra note 180.
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ing cable operators with broadcast programming at "bargain
rates."' 8 3 Chairman Patrick also charged that, because of the
elimination of must-carry rules, the compulsory copyright license hurts local broadcasters in particular. Finally, the Chairman stressed that "the key point about our recommendation
today is that elimination of the compulsory copyright license
'
would benefit consumers."184
The FCC's Report on the Compulsory Copyright License
for Cable Retransmission'"5 was finally released on August 3,
1989. The report recommends that the compulsory license for
all broadcast signals be eliminated, based on the Commission's
determination that consumers will be better served under a full
copyright liability system. The FCC also found that mechaand
nisms exist to facilitate negotiations between cable operators
86
costs.
transaction
moderate
only
with
owners
copyright
According to the report, the compulsory copyright license
fails to achieve market prices in three ways. First, "compulsory
license royalty rates are based on the size of cable systems and
on the number of signals carried, not on the value of particular
programs carried on particular signals."' 8 As a result, the program suppliers and distributors are denied information about
what types of programs viewers want to see.
Second, "logic and evidence suggest that compulsory copyright license rates paid by cable systems and hence the distributions made by the CRT to program suppliers, are below market
prices."' Program suppliers therefore have less incentive to
produce programming that cable viewers want to see. Third, the
CRT consolidation of claims "inevitably reduce[s] the targeting
of compulsory license fees to individual producers based on the
value of their individual programs to consumers."''8 9 Again, information about consumer preferences and incentives to program for consumer preferences are eradicated by the system.
The way to avoid the pitfalls of the compulsory copyright
183. Cable Retransmission, supra note 133, at 6597, 66 R.R.2d at 1300 (statement

of Chairman Dennis Patrick).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Cable Retransmission, supra note 133.
Id. at 6580, 66 R.R.2d at 1286.
Id. at 6571, 66 R.R.2d at 1274.
Id.
Id.
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system, the FCC concludes, is to implement full copyright liability for broadcast programming retransmitted by cable systems. 190 The arguments against such a system, based largely on
transaction costs, are no longer valid (if they ever were) because
of consolidation in the cable industry and the development of
cable networks which already negotiate for copyright licenses for
non-broadcast programming. The Commission noted the existence of dozens of cable networks that-like broadcast networks-acquire rights to individuals programs and then package
those programs for sale to individual cable operators. Such
cable networks would substantially reduce the transaction costs
of negotiating for programming in a full copyright liability
system.
In addition, in the absence of the compulsory copyright license, broadcast television stations and networks could obtain
retransmission rights to the packages of the programming that
they carry. Individual cable operators could then negotiate with
a broadcast station or network for permission to carry each
package of programming, again, eliminating the transaction
costs associated with obtaining programming from numerous
suppliers. The Commission concluded, "The 'networking'
mechanism that is so widely employed in other forms of video
distribution appears well-suited to the acquisiton of cable retransmission rights for broadcast signals, too". 191
2.

Arguments for Restoring the Balance Between
Broadcasters and Cable Operators

A number of leaders in both the broadcast and cable industries have suggested-along the lines of the four CRT Commissioners-that, following the rejection of must-carry rules, a new
compromise is necessary. However, as long as compulsory
copyright remains, compromise will be difficult without mustcarry rules. Some industry leaders may argue that the two are
codependent, and are thus conjunctively necessary to restore the
balance between broadcast and cable. A compromise between
the National Cable Television Association ("NCTA"), Community Antenna Television Association ("CATV"), National As190. Id.
191. Id. at 6563, 66 R.R.2d at 1262.
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soication of Broadcasters ("NAB"), Association of Independent
Television Stations ("INTV") and the Television Operator Caucus ("TOC") was the basis of the FCC's ill-fated second set of
must-carry rules.
Although the compromise must-carry rules were struck
down in court, their existence, and the court's refusal to declare
must-carry rules per se unconstitutional, may signal that the new
compromise between broadcasters and cable operators 'villnot
be based on the abolition of the compulsory license, but instead
on the existence of some form of must-carry rule.
The NAB and the NCTA continue to negotiate for an
agreement on some form of must-carry rules. In July, it appeared that the parties had reached an agreement based on the
FCC's must-carry rules, which were themselves based on a compromise between broadcast and cable interests. 192 One issue separating the parties was whether the must-carry agreement
should hinge on the compulsory copyright license, so that any
cable operator "using the compulsory license must comply with
the carriage requirements. ' 93 The July must-carry compromise
crumbled, however, when the board of the INTV opposed the
deal. The INTV claimed the agreement permitted cable operators to shift independents who broadcast on the UHF band but
were currently
being carried by the cable system on a VHF
1 94
channel.
More recently, rumors were circulating in Washington,
D.C., that a new must-carry agreement had been reached.1 95
Whether consensus has been reached or not, Congress may very
well act on must-carry before it recesses at the end of the Second
Session. On October 25, 1989, Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Communications Subcommittee, promised
that he would include must-carry rules in the bill currently
1 96
pending before the Senate to regulate children's television.
Senator Inouye said, "I will not wait forever for them [represent192. The Must-CarryDeal that Almost Was, BROADCASTING, Jul. 17, 1989, at 27,
28.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 27.
195. See Cable and BroadcastersReopen Must-CarryNegotiations, COMM. DAILY,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 2.
196. The bill was proposed by Senator Metzenbaum, S.707, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
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197
atives of broadcast and cable industries] to come to terms."'
Senator Inouye's proposal would solve the channel positioning issue which has proved so disturbing to independent television stations by requiring, on a one-or-two year interim basis,
that broadcast stations be carried at their broadcast channel location. After the interim period is over, the FCC would be responsible for determining on which channel broadcast stations
should be carried by cable operators. 198
Unfortunately, the current must-carry settlements fail to
address the interests of copyright owners. Cable operators are
still making their livelihood by using copyrighted works for
which the operators do not consistently pay market value. In
the case of works not covered by the compulsory license system,
such as programming generated specifically for cable, cable operators pay market rate. In the case of programming contained
in signals that cable operators would not have been able to import before Malrite, cable operators are now paying near market
rate, though not through a market mechanism. For copyright
owners, the more troubling category is copyrighted works contained in permitted distant signals, which cable operators retransmit and pay only the minimal statutory fees set out in the
Copyright Revision Act. No must-carry compromise addresses
this area.

3.

Arguments for Regulating Cable

Judging from the number and volume of its critics, the compulsory copyright license for cable television would appear to be
doomed. The system seems to have few friends either in places
of political power or in the scholarly literature. Only the courts
have lent the CRT any assistance since its inception, and their
deference is premised entirely on the authority granted to the
Tribunal and the Copyright Office by Congress in the 1976
Copyright Revision Act. What Congress has created, Congress
can dismantle.
The mood in the 101st Congress seems to be in favor of
dismantling anything that helps the cable industry. "Let's face
197. Inouye Suggests Channel Positioning Compromise to Unblock Must-Carry
Jam, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 26, 1989, at 2.

198. Id. at 2-4.
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it," Senator Albert Gore was quoted as saying, "cable TV is a
natural monopoly" with "no regulation and no competition."' 99
Since it convened in 1989, more than a dozen bills have been
introduced in the 101st Congress which would subject the cable
industry to increased government regulation. 200 The bills are
designed to regulate cable rates, mandate cable carriage of
broadcast signals, force cable program producers to sell programming to other video transmission industries, introduce
competition, particularly from telephone companies which are
currently prevented from competing because of the AT&T divestiture process, and limit foreign investment.
The likelihood that any one of the bills will become law is
difficult to predict, particularly in the face of an already crowded
telecommunications agenda in Congress. Moreover, while a
number of the bills link the compulsory copyright license with
some form of must-carry obligations, the compulsory copyright
system has momentum in its favor. It may thus be some time
before Congress eliminates the compulsory copyright license
outright. If the must-carry provisions currently being considered are not enacted, Congress may be more likely to abolish the
compulsory copyright license in response.
Nonetheless, the bills together are an unmistakable indicator that Congress is concerned about developments in the cable
industry, e.g., rising prices, vertical integration, and increasingly
effective competititon with over-the-air broadcasting. They also
are a clear signal to the Bush Administration and the FCC of
Congress' irritation with powerful and largely unregulated cable
interests. John Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, called the cable industry "rapacious"
and said that. there is a growing consensus in Congress that
199. Hill Puts Heat on Cable, BROADCASTNG, May 22, 1989, at 29.
200. H.R. 109, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Bryant); H.R. 1375, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (Schumer); H.R. 2128, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Payne); H.R. 2222,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Shays, Downey, Neal, Pallone, Wilson & Owens); H.R.

2363, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Lent, Downey, McGrath, Mrazeh, Hochbruekner,
Manton & Scheuer); H.R. 2437, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Barcher); S. 817, 101st

Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (DeConcini, Metzenbaum, Simon & Pressler); S. 833, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Metzenbaum & Lieberman); S. 834, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1989) (Metzenbaum, Pressler & Liberman); S. 905, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Lieberman); S. 1068, 101st Cong. Ist Sess. (1989) (Gore, Gorton & Ford).
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"cable needs to be reined in."' 20 1

The FCC and its new, more conciliatory chairman, Alfred
Sikes, have not failed to appreciate Congress' concerns. On December 12, 1989, the Commission launched a "comprehensive"
inquiry into the cable industry's "market power in the video
services marketplace.

' 20 2

While the Commission's inquiry,

which is on a "fast track" and is expected to result in legislative
recommendations by July 1990, is not expected to deal directly
with the compulsory copyright license, it is sure to treat cable's
competitive relationships with broadcast television and other
video distribution technologies. The inquiry is almost certain to
have the effect of staying Congress' hand until the summer, but
it is equally likely to provide the foundation for future Congressional action. That action seems certain to either abolish the
compulsory copyright license, or retain it only in exchange for
significant regulation of the cable industry.
CONCLUSION

The compulsory copyright license system is fundamentally
flawed. As applied to permitted signals, the system substantially
undercharges cable operators for the use of copyrighted works,
and correspondingly undercompensates copyright owners. As
applied to not-permitted signals, while the fees charged are
closer to market rate, the compulsory license system interferes
with market operation without apparent benefit to either the industries involved or the public.
The compulsory license subsidizes an industry that is no
longer in its infancy, and no longer warrants subsidies. Cable
systems today have been installed in 49.5 million homes, i.e., almost 55 percent of U.S. homes that have televisions. 20 3 The
compulsory copyright license rates do not equal, nor in the case
of rates for permitted signals do they near, the real market value
of the cable operators' uses of the copyrighted works. If the
rates do reflect market value, then there is no need for the CRT.
If they do not, then the CRT is blocking market equilibrium, to
the unfair advantage of cable operators and the disadvantage of
201. Dingell Callsfor New Regulatory Constraintson Cable, COMM. DAILY, Jan.
26, 1990, at 1.
202. FCCPuts Cable Inquiryon "FastTrack" COMM. DAILY, Dec. 13, 1989, at 1.
203. Cable Television Developments, supra note 1, at 1.
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. broadcasters, copyright owners, and competing new
technologies.
The compulsory license system is also inefficient. On average, distributions have been delayed almost three years by stacks
of petitions, days of hearings, countless studies, and relentless
appeals. Moreover, there is no valid reason for treating cable
differently than other users of copyrighted works. The allegation that cable would be crippled by the transaction costs of negotiating for copyright licenses is negated by the fact that
broadcasters have been negotiating for licenses for copyrighted
programs without a legislative scheme for more than two decades. Cable operators already negotiate for three out of four
programs their systems carry with producers of cable
programming.
The compulsory license threatens to cripple broadcasters.
While the compulsory license has no inherent relationship with
must-carry and syndicated exclusivity rules, it is fundamentally
inequitable to allow cable operators the freedom to pick and
choose which broadcast signals they carry, while forbidding
broadcasters from charging cable operators for the value of that
programming. The FCC's new syndex rules face an uncertain
fate before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals; the likelihood of
must-carry rules being passed by Congress and upheld by courts
is even less certain. Rather than hope for the eventual operation
of these rules and engage in further regulation of the video transmission industries, Congress should abolish the compulsory license and allow the market to regulate dealings between cable
operators and broadcasters.
The impact of the compulsory license on broadcasters is exacerbated because the license system exposes broadcast programming to undercompensated retransmission by cable
operators. The compulsory license gives copyright owners a significant incentive to distribute their works through other means,
such as STV and video, which allows the copyright owners to
obtain as much value as possible for their works. Copyright
owners can thus require cable operators, in addition to STV operators and video producers, to purchase licenses to show the
copyrighted works.
The ultimate effect of the compulsory copyright license is to
diminish the value of broadcast television as an outlet for new
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programming. As a result, program producers have less incentive to produce quality programming that responds to consumer
preferences. The quantity and quality of the programming that
is available to the public at no direct cost is decreased.
The cable industry has demonstrated its ability and willingness to compete in a substantially unregulated market. There is
no longer any justification for subsidizing cable, for penalizing
broadcasters and copyright owners, or for limiting the programming available to the public via over-the-air television.
Congress should abolish the compulsory license in favor of
full copyright liability for all "public performances" of a copyrighted work. Cable operators would thus be required to negotiate with the copyright owners whose works are broadcast overthe-air and then retransmitted by cable, just as cable operators
already do for the bulk of their programming which is either not
broadcast first or the broadcast of which is not covered by the
compulsory license. In the alternative, if ad hoc negotiations
prove unworkable, cable operators can negotiate directly with
copyright owners for a second "Great Compromise'"-some
form of private licensing system that will accurately reflect market value of the copyrighted works.

